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R O E L  M E I J E R Who are the 48 men on the two lists 
published by the Saudi authorities of 
most wanted terrorists (the “List of 19” 
and the “List of 26”) and the list of the 
twelve who had died in the first suicide 
attack in Riyad on 12 May by the al-
Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula (QAP)? 
The place of origin and tribal back-
ground of the QAP members listed in 
these lists is highly diverse, but it is noticeable that at least thirteen 
lived in Riyadh, with nine of them in the Suwaydi quarter which ap-
pears to be the hotbed of the movement. 
The social background of the members is more difficult to ascertain 
because not all lists contain the necessary information. Some have an 
upper-middle class background (their fathers being dentists, high-rank-
ing civil servants, and police officers), and a few have a lower middle 
class background. Remarkably, quite a number were married, including 
those who lost their lives in the suicide bombings in Riyad. One of the 
most striking features of the group is their youth with 27 being their 
average age. The four leaders who belong to the “second generation” of 
al-Qa‘ida were in their early thirties, while most of their followers were 
younger, some of them as young as 22. Moreover, the average age of 
the members of one of the QAP cells, the “Khalidyya cell,” located in 
Mecca, was only nineteen.
Educational Background
QAP also shows an interesting picture both in terms of the level and 
kind of education of its members. Whereas the non-violent Islamist 
movement is typically a student movement, only eighteen of the listed 
members had a higher education and only ten of these had acquired a 
degree. Quite a few did not even have a secondary school certificate. 
None of the four leaders of the movement finished secondary school.
The type of education of the QAP members is also remarkable. While 
supporters of Islamist movements very often have a background in 
the technical and natural sciences or 
in medicine, this was the case for only 
two of the listed QAP members, while 
at least twelve had enjoyed a religious 
higher education. Most of them stud-
ied at the Imam Muhammad bin Sa‘ud 
Islamic University in Riyadh. This root-
ing in religious studies also explains 
why the formulation and spreading of 
ideology plays such an important role in this group. While most mem-
bers were coined “foot soldiers” (muqatilin maydaniyyin), nine were 
called “sharia theoreticians” (munazzarin shari‘iyyin). It was this small 
group of “intellectuals” that wrote the articles for QAP’s bi-monthly in-
ternet-magazine, Sawt al-Jihad and, thereby, spread the group’s ideas 
of jihad amongst a large audience.
Afghanistan
The one common characteristic of the QAP members was their 
connection with Afghanistan. Nearly half of the persons listed had 
been in training camps in Afghanistan and at a very young age. The 
first three leaders had gone there when still in their teens, and the 
third leader, ‘Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin, “Abu Hajir,” when he was 17 years 
old. Later he became a trainer himself and left Afghanistan to fight 
in Algeria, Bosnia, and Somalia. The first leader, Yusuf al-Ayiri, was 
trained in Afghanistan during the early 1990s, while the second 
leader, Khalid Hajj, “Abu Hazim al-Sha‘ir,” had probably been there at 
a later date. At least ten from the younger generation either fought 
side by side with the Taliban or with Osama bin Laden in the caves of 
Tora Bora against the Americans when they were still in their teens 
or early twenties. It may very well be that these probably traumatic 
experiences, together with the Saudi endorsement of the American 
demolition of the Taliban, led them to add to their struggle against 
the “external enemy,” the United States, a struggle against the “inter-
nal enemy,” Saudi Arabia.
Finally, there has been considerable debate on the organi-
zation of al-Qaida. Some commentators regard it as a loose 
network with no central command structure. This evaluation 
may apply more to al-Qaida on the international than on the 
local level. For, although it is not clear how the Saudi “cells” 
are linked, the information available from the three official 
lists points to a hierarchical organization. It seems clear that 
the QAP had a leadership, a propaganda and a sharia com-
mittee, as well as subordinate military cells. This structure 
suffered, however, severe blows during the first clampdown. 
The ensuing disarray within the movement could account 
for the diversity in tactics, ranging from suicide bombings of 
foreign resident compounds to bombings of state buildings, 
to the random killing of foreigners in the street. To what ex-
tent the network is still able to mobilize its sympathizers is a 
moot point, but it seems unlikely that the attacks in Jedda in 




Since May 2003 Saudi Arabia has been 
the scene of an armed confrontation between 
al-Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula (QAP) and 
the State. The Saudi authorities issued three 
lists of suspects who were either wanted or 
already killed. These lists provide some insight 
into the background of QAP members and 
the nature of the organization.1
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 Note
1. The information herein was collected from 
Arabic newspapers and corroborated with 
the information gathered from Sawt al-Jihad, 
the web-publication of QAP.
